Adaptive water resource management in the South Indian Lower Bhavani Project Command Area by Lannerstad, M. & Molden, David
Mats Lannerstad and David Molden
Adaptive Water Resource
Management in the South










The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects—from computer
modeling to experience with water user associations—and vary in content from
directly applicable research to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately
depends. Some research reports are narrowly focused, analytical and detailed
empirical studies; others are wide-ranging and synthetic overviews of generic
problems.
Although most of the reports are published by IWMI staff and their collaborators,
we welcome contributions from others. Each report is reviewed internally by IWMI
staff, and by external reviewers. The reports are published and distributed both in
hard copy and electronically (www.iwmi.org) and where possible all data and analyses
will be available as separate downloadable files. Reports may be copied freely and
cited with due acknowledgment.
About IWMI
IWMI’s mission is to improve the management of land and water resources for food,
livelihoods and environment. In serving this mission, IWMI concentrates on the
integration of policies, technologies and management systems to achieve workable
solutions to real problems—practical, relevant results in the field of irrigation and
water and land resources.i
International Water Management Institute
P O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka
IWMI Research Report 129
Adaptive Water Resource Management in the
South Indian Lower Bhavani Project
Command Area
Mats Lannerstad and David Moldenii
The authors: Mats Lannerstad is a Researcher at the Department of Water and
Environmental Studies at Linköping University, Sweden (mats@lannerstad.com); David
Molden is Deputy Director General – Research at the International Water Management
Institute (IWMI), Colombo, Sri Lanka (d.molden@cgiar.org).
Lannerstad, M.; Molden, D. 2009. Adaptive water resource management in the South
Indian Lower Bhavani Project Command Area. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water
Management Institute. 38p. (IWMI Research Report 129)
/ river basins / case studies / water scarcity / irrigation programs / water allocation / water
supply / farmers / canals / cropping systems / policy / water resource management / rice
/ crop management / India /
ISSN 1026-0862
ISBN  978-92-9090-703-9
Copyright © 2009, by IWMI. All rights reserved. IWMI encourages the use of its material
provided that the organization is acknowledged and kept informed in all such instances.
Cover photographs (clockwise from bottom left):
(a) LBP/Bhavanisagar Reservoir
(b) Flow measure, LBP canal
(c) Groundnut cultivation, LBP
(d) Paddy transplanting, LBP
(e) Paddy harvest, LBP
(f) LBP canal
Photo credits: Mats Lannerstad (all photographs).
Please send inquiries and comments to: iwmi@cgiar.org
A free copy of this publication can be downloaded at
http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/IWMI_Research_Reports/index.aspxiii
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Palaniappan Gomathinayagam (Chennai) for sharing his knowledge
and insights, and for invaluable support during fieldwork; Chennimalai Mayilswami (Coimbatore) for
support with data collection; the Lower Bhavani Farmers’ Federation (Erode) for sharing knowledge
and documents; the Public Works Department (Erode and Coimbatore districts) for sharing data;
and Paul Appasamy (Coimbatore), Jan Lundqvist (Linköping) and Malin Falkenmark (Stockholm) for
valuable comments and suggestions on the manuscript.
Project
This research study was initiated as part of the Comprehensive
Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture project.
Partners
This research study is a collaboration of the following organizations:
Donors
This research was supported by Formas, the Swedish Research Council
for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning, and contributes
to the Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture.
Financial support for the Comprehensive Assessment comes from
a range of donors, including core support from the Governments of the
Netherlands, Switzerland and the World Bank in support of Systemwide
Programs. Project-specific support comes from the Governments of Austria,
Japan, Sweden (through the Swedish Water House) and Taiwan; Challenge
Program on Water and Food (CPWF); EU support to the ISIIMM Project;
FAO; the OPEC Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation; Oxfam Novib and
CGIAR Gender and Diversity Program. Cosponsors of the Assessment are
the: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR),
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) and the Ramsar Convention.
Linköping University, Sweden
International Water Management Institute





Introduction: Rapid Change and Increased Complexity 1
Adaptive Water Management: Concepts and Analysis Framework 2
The Case Study: Water Scarcity and the Lower Bhavani Project 5
AWM Analysis and Discussion 21
Conclusion and Messages for Policymakers 26
References 28vivii
management systems, and have continued to adjust
their practices in the face of change.
This paper presents a five-step framework of
analysis based on recent theories of AM to
understand the extent to which it is practiced and
how it could be improved. The Adaptive Water
Management (AWM) analysis shows that the LBP
system has increasingly fulfilled the criteria of a
complex adaptive system over the years. Social
learning takes place at system and farmer level. The
main uncertainty factor, rainfall variability, has been
considered in a stepwise way during the system
change cycles and has been included in the
system design. The system has, to some extent,
fulfilled the requirement of an adaptive regime and
has built a substantial amount of social capital. This
has been a rather ad hoc process, which could
have been much faster had attention been paid to
institutional setups and infrastructure designs that
support AM.
However, the future will not be easier. The basin
is closed with water resources already over-
allocated to various uses. Yet, cities and industries,
and users outside the basin, will demand more and
agriculture itself is becoming less important to the
economy. To meet these future challenges, it is
essential that policymakers recognize and build on
the existing social capital and the negotiation and
learning systems that have been developed.
Finally, the LBP case study gives us some
hope. In spite of contending with an imperfect
irrigation system design and intense competition for
water resources, water resource managers and
farmers are able to adapt and continue to reap
benefits from a productive agricultural system.
Summary
This study explores the theory and practice of
Adaptive Management (AM) based on a detailed
field study. To what extent farmers and water
resource managers already practice AM; and
whether it is practiced in an optimal manner or
could there be areas for improvement based on
recent advancements in the theory of AM; are some
of the questions that are particularly appropriate in
the light of rapid changes in river basin water use
and also in relation to basin closure.
This paper draws on the development and use
of water resources in the Lower Bhavani Project
(LBP), with the LBP reservoir and the 84,000
hectare (ha) LBP command area. The project
diverts water from the Bhavani River, a tributary of
the Cauvery River, in the South Indian state of Tamil
Nadu. The LBP was the first major irrigation project
initiated in India after independence in 1947 and
was in full operation by 1956. The LBP has had a
major impact on the socioeconomic development of
the area, and continues to be a productive irrigated
area.
However, behind the story of a productive
irrigation system lie more complex stories of
societal change, conflicts and negotiation in
response to water scarcity and several drivers of
change. In fact, there were problems from the start,
as the original design concept for the project was
not accepted by farmers who opted for more water-
intensive crops rather than the suggested ‘dry
crops’. In addition, a highly fluctuating climate and
the transfer of water to urban areas have all been
a challenge for agricultural producers. Farmers,
system managers and others have responded to
these challenges by trying out differentviii1
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Introduction: Rapid Change and Increased Complexity
It has now been accepted that natural resource
management has to be viewed in a context of
constant change. Neither the environment nor the
society is static, and we all have to live with
change and have to adapt to new demands and
realities. One of those changes is the pressure on
food production systems, with global population
increases, increasing GDP and purchasing power,
which in many countries increases the demand for
food and other agricultural commodities (Bruinsma
2003; Alexandratos et al. 2006). Water, the
bloodstream of the biosphere (Falkenmark 2003),
will be one of the most decisive factors restraining,
or enhancing, agricultural production in many
countries (Falkenmark and Rockström 2004;
Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management
in Agriculture 2007). World population is estimated
to increase to 8.3 billion by 2030 and to 9.2 billion
by 2050, an increase of more than 40% in the
coming decades (UN 2008, medium projection
2006 revision). Consequently, food demands, with
rising average diet levels, are expected to rise by
another 50%, at least, in the coming decades
(Alexandratos et al. 2006), and unless changes are
made, this may also require 50% more water
(Rockström et al.  2007; Comprehensive
Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture
2007). Water for biofuel production (e.g., Berndes
2008) and the implications of climate change on
water resources (Bates et al. 2008) further increase
this complexity. This development draws attention
to the concept of adaptive water resources
management that aims to handle change in an
increasingly complex and unpredictable human-
environmental-technology system (NeWater 2005)
- an ability that will be of critical importance for the
future.
It is easy to discuss the general issue on a
global level. The question is how people can or
could react to these drivers of rapid change on a
local scale. Will agricultural systems collapse as
a result of environmental failure? Will they stagnate
because people cannot cope with rapid changes?
Or will they be able to positively respond by
making changes themselves? Within agricultural
water management, irrigation systems, in
particular, have developed a reputation of having low
resilience, and are thus vulnerable to change. The
idea that they are subject to collapse is perhaps
most well-known from the popular book Pillar of
Sand (Postel 1999). Postel questions whether the
“irrigation miracle” can last and analyzes whether
the rise and fall of historic irrigation-based
civilizations can offer some lessons for our globally
irrigated society. Given the importance of irrigation
in food production, a downfall of today´s irrigation
systems would be devastating to both individual
farmers and also to the global food system. But is
it really likely or are irrigation system users
capable of adapting to the changing environmental
and societal drivers?
This study explores this area and other
theoretical and practical questions related to AM in
irrigation using a detailed case study of the LBP in
Tamil Nadu, Southern India. In the LBP system,
there is both a large livelihood dependence on2
agriculture and intense pressure from within and
without on the system’s water resources. In order to
try and answer these questions, the paper
describes how people act, cope and adapt locally to
deal with environmental preconditions and changing
human demands, taking into account a century-long
perspective, and then considering the last 50 years
in more detail. The study will concentrate on a real
and complex case where farmers’ federations and
single farmers, irrigation engineers and other
authorities have adapted in various ways to urgent
societal needs, farmers’ desires, changes in water
availability, and seasonal and inter-annual climate
variability. The paper will examine whether or not
AM is practiced, and shed light on whether the
system can cope with future demands.
Adaptive Water Management: Concepts and Analysis Framework
The concept of AM “can more generally be defined
as a systematic process for improving
management policies and practices by learning
from the outcomes of management strategies that
have already been implemented” (Pahl-Wostl et al.
2007: 4). “Adaptive management is learning to
manage by managing to learn” (NeWater 2005: 7).
The starting point for AM originates from the field
of industrial operation theory developed during the
1950s (Johnson 1999). In the 1970s, it was applied
to resource issues and developed into the concept
of “Adaptive Resource Management”, sometimes
called “Adaptive Ecosystem Management” (Holling
and Marshall 2002).
AM stands in contrast to coping (Table 1). Ad
hoc and reactive responses, during a time of
emergency or rapid change, aimed at short-term
survival are examples of coping strategies. Adaptive
strategies are instead proactive adjustments aimed
at promoting, for example, long-term ecosystem
integrity and human well-being. Whether actors
choose coping or adaptive strategies is often the
result of existing or missing capacity of factors like
social learning and institutional change based on
shared experiences, often over long periods of time
and transferred over several generations (Fabricius
et al. 2007).
In AM cycles, policies and practices are
adapted as circumstances change and people
learn. Identification of problems and goals are
followed by the development and implementation of
policies and practices to meet these goals.
Monitoring of the results provides the basis for re-
formulation of problems and goals, and the cycle
(Figure 1) begins again in an iterative way. An
important part of the process, already mentioned
above, is stakeholder participation and social
learning (Stringer et al. 2006). According to this
thinking, management decisions should be based
upon site-specific information gained through
TABLE 1. The characteristics of coping and adaptive strategies in communities (Source: Fabricius et al. 2007).
Coping strategies Adaptive strategies
Aims Survival Both survival and sustainable management of
social-ecological systems
Time frames Short-term, immediate Long-term, evolving over several generations
Response types Reactive, opportunistic Proactive, planned
Learning Limited, through individual experience and Extensive, through knowledge exchange,
innovation inter-generational transfer and institutional
development3
experimentation with management (Blumenthal and
Jannink 2000). The AM approach acknowledges
that time and resources are too limited to delay
actions until ‘enough’ information is known. This is
of particular relevance to addressing urgent
problems such as “human poverty and declines in
the abundance of valued biota. ... Adaptive
management is about urgency, acting without
knowing enough, and learning” (Lee 1999: 5).
The adaptive capacity of a system is a
“measure of the thresholds within which systems
are able to deal with change: systems with high
adaptive capacities can thus retain their integrity
under a broader range of conditions than systems
with low adaptive capacities. ... In social systems,
adaptive capacity refers to the ability to learn from
mistakes and to generate experience of dealing
with change, which in turn largely depends on the
ability of individuals and their social networks to
innovate” (Fabricius et al. 2007: 1-2).
Adaptive Water Management (AWM)
A significant body of work has moved the adaptive
resource management concept to the specific field
of water and advocated adaptive water
management (AWM), or adaptive water resource
management (AWRM), approaches (e.g., Holling
and Marshall 2002; NeWater 2007; Pahl-Wostl et
al. 2007; Lankford et al. 2007). For example, Pahl-
Wostl et al. (2007) favor an AWM approach in line
with the steps of the general AM approach. Their
definition of AWM is, however, somewhat broader
than the original definition of AM (as defined above)
and is more to be viewed as a guiding paradigm to
design adaptive policy processes (NeWater 2007).
In particular, they discuss how AWM can improve
the conceptual and methodological basis for
achieving sustainable and integrated water
management in an uncertain and complex world,
and consider four parameters: uncertainty; the
AWM process; AWM regimes; and social learning.
Uncertainty
Three kinds of uncertainty must be taken into
account in AWM: (1) Lack of knowledge related to
availability and variability of data, (2) Uncertainty in
our understanding of water systems, and (3)
Uncertainty related to potential shocks such as
climate variability.
The AWM process
To manage the possible impacts of these
uncertainties and sustain capacity to react to their
outcomes requires the development, implementation
and reflection of a policy process as shown in
Figure 1. By following this process, it is theorized,
the adaptive capacity of the water system is
increased by introducing learning processes and
establishing the necessary conditions for these
processes to take place. During the process
management strategies, and even goals, might
themselves be adapted as new information surfaces
and uncertainties become realities.
FIGURE 1. Iterative cycle of policy development and implementation in adaptive management (Source: modified from Pahl-
Wostl et al. 2007; and NeWater 2007).4
AWM regimes
A management regime refers to the entire “complex
of technologies, institutions, environmental factors,
and paradigms that are highly interconnected and
essential to the functioning of the management
system that is targeted to fulfil a societal function
such as water supply or flood protection” (Pahl-
Wostl et al. 2007: 8). In Table 2, two contrasting
regimes are compared, “prediction-and-control” and
“integrated adaptive”. The first regime is based
upon the assumption that human-environmental-
technology systems are predictable and
controllable. The latter instead recognises and is
organized to handle the complexity and
unpredictability characterising such systems. The
structural requirements that according to Pahl-
Wostl et al. (2007) are likely to typify an integrated
adaptive regime are presented for five
characteristics.
A regime has the capacity to be adaptive if its
performance can meet three requirements. First,
information such as performance must be collected
and monitored, formally or informally, over a
sufficient time period. Second, actors in the
management system must be able to understand
the information and draw meaningful conclusions.
Third, those actors must be able and willing to
implement change to the management system,
and actors must thus be informed in a way that
make them understand the reasons behind
suggested changes (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007).
Social learning
As discussed, social learning is considered an
important part of AWM. From a perspective of river
basin management, social learning develops and
sustains the capacity of authorities, experts,
interest groups and the public to experiment, learn,
discuss and manage their water effectively as
conditions change. The social learning and
interaction helps people recognize inter-
dependence and differences, and can thus enable
collective action and resolution of conflicts. In a
water resource system, technical infrastructure, the
behavior and habits of users, and engineering rules
of good practice are often mutually dependent and
stabilize each other. This might block changes
towards the improvement of water resource
management schemes. According to the theory,
with social learning such barriers can be overcome
and open up possibilities for sustaining AM
practices, with new innovative technologies and
practices (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007).
AWM Analysis
Based on the general ideas outlined above and
explicitly discussed in the work by Claudia Pahl-
Wostl and her colleagues within the EU-financed
research project “New Approaches to Adaptive
Water Management under Uncertainty” and articles
published in the journal “Ecology and Science”,
TABLE 2. Ideal-typical characterizations of a prediction-and-control and an integrated adaptive water management regime
(Source: modified from Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007).
Characteristic Prediction-and-control regime Integrated adaptive regime
Governance Centralized and hierarchical, with narrow Polycentric and horizontal, with broad
structure stakeholder participation. stakeholder participation.
Sectoral integration Sectors are separately analyzed, resulting in policy Cross-sectoral analysis identifies emergent
conflicts and the emergence of chronic problems. problems and integrates policy implementation.
Scale of analysis Transboundary problems arise when river sub- Transboundary issues are addressed by
and operation basins are the exclusive scale of analysis and multiple scales of analysis and management.
management.
Information Understanding is fragmented by gaps and the failure Comprehensive understanding is achieved by
management to integrate information sources that are proprietary. open, shared information sources that fill gaps
and facilitate integration.
Infrastructure A massive, centralized infrastructure has single A decentralized infrastructure on an appropriate
sources of design, power, and delivery. scale has diverse sources of design, power, and
delivery.5
this paper examines how AM has or has not
occurred over a 50-year time span in the LBP. The
analysis, thus, aims to see how well the LBP has
adapted without being guided by any theory. The
framework for analysis focuses on five questions:
1) Is the LBP system adapting to changes or
only coping with changes?
2) What levels of uncertainty exist in the LBP
system? What determines or impacts the level
of uncertainty?
3) Is it possible to distinguish cycles of AWM in
the LBP system during the last 50 years, i.e.,
goal setting, and policy formulation,
implementation, monitoring, and assessment
and feedback?
4) Can the LBP system be described as an
“integrated adaptive regime”? Which
‘characteristic’ requirements exist in the LBP
system and do they change over time? Does
the system prove to have an ‘adaptive
capacity’?
5) Is there social learning within the LBP
system? Is it short-term or long-term? Does
the knowledge stay with the actors in the
system, or is it lost over time?
Within these questions, issues of actors (e.g.,
farmers, water managers, politicians, society), time
scale (e.g., cropping season, years) and spatial
scale (e.g., farm, irrigation system, river basin,
boundaries of the AWM system) will also be
addressed.
We use these questions to analyze whether or
not AM has taken place. To answer these
questions, a variety of approaches were used
including analysis of existing literature and maps;
secondary water flow and allocation data, and other
statistics; interviews with key actors; and extensive
field trips in the area to gain an understanding of
scale and context.
The Case Study: Water Scarcity and the Lower Bhavani Project
The Lower Bhavani Project (LBP) is located in the
Southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Most parts of
Tamil Nadu lie in the rain shadow area of the
Western Ghats and, unlike other parts of India, do
not benefit from the relatively reliable Southwest
monsoon from June to September. Instead, the
state has to rely mainly on the unpredictable and
erratic Northeastern monsoon from October to
December, which is characterised by cyclones and
short and heavy downpours. The high variability in
annual and seasonal rainfall and the hot climate
pose a challenge to agriculture.
Food shortage has, thus, often been a problem
in Tamil Nadu. For example, in the eighteenth
century, major famines occurred in 1709-1711,
1728, 1731-1734, 1737, 1782 and 1792. ’Mari’
means rain, and the importance of rainfall and
water being the limiting factor for a sustained
livelihood is illustrated by the worshipping of the
Goddess “Mariamma” in almost every village
(Mohanakrishnan 2001: 1). Construction of tanks to
capture local runoff, bullock bailing from wells, and
temporary or permanent weirs to divert water from
the rivers have long been a tradition to overcome
highly variable climatic conditions and also to
enable irrigation (Rathnavel and Gomathinayagam
2006).
The Cauvery Basin (81,000 square kilometers
(km
2)) is the largest basin in Southern India and
the most important source of water in Tamil Nadu.
In the second century A.D., the Grand Weir (Grand
Anicut) was constructed across the Cauvery River
to distribute the river flow across the delta area,
which is still the largest command area in the
basin (Figure 2). The Bhavani Basin is the fourth
largest sub-basin of the Cauvery and covers an6
area of 6,200 km
2. Weirs, some tanks and a large
number of open wells were constructed during
historic times as methods of adapting to natural
water limits. The Kalingarayan Weir, just before the
confluence with the Cauvery River, was built in the
thirteenth century, and the Kodiveri Weir, further
upstream, was constructed in the seventeenth
century (Figure 2) (PWD n.d. (a)). The Kalingarayan
(named after a local ruler) and Kodiveri weirs were
the first major local attempts to adapt to water
scarcity in the basin. The construction of the
Kodiveri Weir, upstream of Kalingarayan, also
created the first direct link between two irrigated
systems in the basin and was the first step
towards today’s complex situation where the basin
river flows are controlled by people.
The Coimbatore and Erode districts (Figure 2),
covering part of the Bhavani Basin and the entire
LBP command area, are described as areas “of
exceptional dryness” with “not less than two-thirds
of the seasons” as “unfavorable” (Madras
Presidency 1902). The years 1804-1805, 1806,
1808, 1812, 1813, 1823, 1831, 1832, 1834, 1836,
1861, 1866, 1876-1878, 1891-1892, 1892-1893,
1894-1895, 1904-1905 and 1905-1906 were all years
with serious water scarcity and many of these
years are described with words such as “scarcity,
desolation and disease” or “famine, sickness and
death”. In 1808, the failure of both monsoons
caused a famine “that carried off half the population”,
while the “The Great Famine” between 1876 and
1878 is described as being “more disastrous in
effect than any of its predecessors” (Madras
Presidency 1902; Baliga 1966: 17).
The situation in the Coimbatore District called
for improvements and an extension of existing
irrigation structures, or the construction of new
schemes. As early as 1834, the British engineer
Sir Arthur Cotton thought of building a reservoir in
the Bhavani Basin. Several proposals followed. By
the end of the nineteenth century, the main goal,
however, was to create a reservoir across the
Bhavani or Cauvery River to protect the faraway
Cauvery Delta. The upstream dam would even out
the monsoon variability and moderate the re-
occurring floods that caused damage to people and
property in the delta, and ensure a steady flow
during drought conditions (GoM 1965: 8; Barber
1940: 3).
In 1901, a potential scheme across the
Bhavani River was compared with a proposal for a
reservoir across the Cauvery River at Mettur,
upstream of the confluence of the Bhavani and
Cauvery rivers. The final decision favored a reservoir
across the Cauvery, and triggered a renewal of
earlier ‘Madras-Mysore disputes’ between the
Madras (Tamil Nadu) and the Mysore (Karnataka)
governments over the flow of the Cauvery River. As
a result, the project was delayed 15 years and was
eventually sanctioned after the interstate
agreement in 1924. The largest reservoir in Tamil
Nadu, the Mettur Dam, is 2,650 million cubic
meters (Mm
3), was completed in 1934 (Barber
1940: 14), and it introduced a water storage to
balance the river flow reaching the Grand Weir
(Figure 2).
It was only after the sanctioning of the Mettur
Dam that plans for a reservoir in the Bhavani Basin
were considered again. In 1928, the government
concluded that a reservoir should be located at the
confluence of Moyar and Bhavani rivers. This “The
Lower Bhavani Project” (LBP) would be more
remunerative than the competing alternative with
two reservoirs further upstream, “The Upper
Bhavani Project”. Design and development for a
command area in the Coimbatore District
continued until 1938. The LBP, like many other
irrigation projects investigated by the British, was,
however, not sanctioned since the investment did
not meet the British requirements for economic
return (Baliga 1966: 259; GoM 1965: 4;
Mohanakrishnan 2001: 58).
After Burma was separated from India in 1937
and Japan entered World War II, the annual grain
import of 1.5-2 million tonnes (total Indian
production was 46 million tonnes) from Burma to
India was stopped, and imports from alternative
sources like the USA, Canada and Australia were
impossible. With the Bengal Famine in 1943, food
problems became acute on a national scale.
Several factors added to the difficulty in
matching food supply with food demand: Food
consumption per capita was already below the
minimum standards of nutrition; the Indian7
population increased 100 million (or 37%) to 370
million from 1931 to 1951 (GoI 2005); and
agricultural production stayed static. In addition,
the partitioning of India into Pakistan and the Indian
Union reduced grain supplies further by 0.7-0.8
million tonnes per year, as a proportionately larger
part of the cereal production and irrigated lands
went to Pakistan (GoI 1952).
FIGURE 2. LBP, Bhavani Basin and Cauvery Basin in a hydrological, irrigation and administrative context (Source: areas of
the Cauvery Basin were modified from GoI (2007), not to scale).8
In April 1942, after the separation from Burma,
a “Conference of Representatives of the Provinces
and the Indian States” met to discuss increasing
food production. The recommendations formed the
basis for the “Grow More Food” Campaign that
strongly influenced agriculture in the coming
decades. The measures to increase food production
focused on: (a) switching from cash crops like
cotton to grain, (b) intensifying cultivation with
irrigation, better seeds and farming practices, and
(c) cultivating all fallow and other cultivable land.
The “Minor Irrigation Programme” focused on work
that could be implemented quickly and did not
demand large funds. The programme aimed at both
private work, such as the building of wells, tanks
and water lifting appliances, and public measures,
such as channels, embankments, tube wells and
public tanks (GoI 1952).
“Medium” and “Major” irrigation projects
demanded more planning and funds. The LBP, with
the LBP Reservoir and the LBP Canal, was,
however, already set for implementation and could
thus be the first “Major” project initiated in India
after independence in August 1947. The “motto for
the government was to eradicate poverty in the
country and bring prosperity to the people”. The
criterion for minimum economic return was
disregarded and the project was approved by the
National Government as a “Post-War Development
Scheme”. The project was formally sanctioned by
the Cabinet of the Madras State on September 19,
1947 (GoM 1966: 14). The work commenced,
according to modified British plans, in 1948. Water
was released into the LBP canal for the head
region in 1952/53 and the full command area was
in operation by September 1956 (ibid p.16).
Local, regional and national food concerns,
thus, finally granted the famine-prone Bhavani Basin
area with the LBP in 1956. Total reservoir storage
is 929 Mm
3 (PWD n.d. (a)). Together with the
hydropower reservoirs from the 1960s and a
smaller drinking water reservoir from 1984 in the
elevated upper part of the Bhavani Basin, the total
large-scale storage, today, reaches almost 1,500
Mm
3 (Figure 2). This quantity equals the average
yearly inflow to the LBP Reservoir during the last
few decades. The reservoir was the first major local
adaptation to the climate preconditions in the area,
and also a major step towards a basin where all
river flows, except for extreme floods or droughts,
could be largely controlled by people.
LBP Command Level Adaptations
In the half century since the LBP was completed,
dramatic societal development has taken place in
India and Tamil Nadu. The Indian population has
increased almost threefold since 1950 to more
than 1,100 million in 2007. In Coimbatore and
Erode districts (Figure 2), the combined population
increased even more dramatically from 1.8 million
in 1901 to 3.2 million in 1951, and to 6.9 million in
2001 (Economist 2007; GoI 2005).
As late as the mid-1960s, India continued to
witness serious drought and near-famine conditions
with food shortages only partly made up by food
aid imports, mainly from the United States under
Public Law 480 (P.L. 480). In response came a
major shift in the Indian food policy, with public
investments in agriculture, both domestic and
international, eventually resulting in the take off of
the Green Revolution at the end of the 1960s. In
1976, food production self-sufficiency targets were
met for the first time (del Ninno et al. 2005).
Despite the dramatic population growth, food
shortage on a national level is not a problem
anymore. Due to the lack of purchasing power,
however, more than 200 million people are still
undernourished (FAO 2006).
India as a nation has moved from an
agricultural economy with famines towards a
society where, in 2006, agriculture only stood for
19% of GDP, while services (54%) and industry
(27%), dominate. The export of agricultural goods
reaches US$10 billion, representing about 10% of
all exports (Economist 2007). In Tamil Nadu,
agriculture only represents 11% of the 2004/2005
Net State Domestic Product, but 47% of the 28
million large workforce are either ‘cultivators’ or
‘agricultural laborers’. Agriculture is, thus, still of
great importance for the livelihoods of many people,
but more and more of marginal importance to the
state economy (Department of Economics and
Statistics 2006). So, while agriculture plays a
diminishing role in the economy, the large number9
of farmers still constitutes an important political
power in the Indian democracy.
The post-LBP completion period has been, in
other words, a time of dramatic agrarian change in
India. During that period, a number of alterations in
water allocations and water use have taken place
within the LBP command area, both at system and
farm levels. The changes in the LBP system are,
to a large extent, linked to, and must be
understood within, the general Indian agricultural
and social development context. As will be
explained later on in the report, the changes since
the inauguration of the LBP can be viewed as
adaptations to climatic conditions, demands of
farmers, acute national food demands, and a shift
from the cultivation of coarse grains towards
meeting the rising demands for paddy, and
following the general rapid societal development.
Estimates of British Time Engineers for the
LBP
The first quantification of the average amount of
water resources available in the Bhavani Basin that
could be allocated for a new command area was
done during the first decades of the twentieth
century. In the 1940s, a few years before the end
of British rule, the average amount of water
resources available for the LBP command area was
estimated at 650 Mm
3 annually. This figure takes
into account riparian water rights to downstream
historic Kalingarayan and Kodiveri canals and the
potential need to supplement Mettur Dam releases
for the Cauvery Delta. The water quantity was
estimated to be sufficient for a command area of
69,000 hectares with irrigated ‘dry crops’, such as
cotton, millets and groundnut. This was an amount
and a cropping pattern designed not to optimize
food production but rather to optimize the economic
return and produce cotton for the local industry or
for export. The water demand design of 650 Mm
3
per year was based on a river flow analysis carried
out during 27 years from 1916 to 1942. The water
quantities estimated to be available for the LBP
was decided in the perspective of a high inter-
annual variability of precipitation in the catchment
area of the LBP Reservoir. The recorded river flow
data showed that the entire project area could only
be fully irrigated during 16 years, part of the area
in 7 years, and none in 4 years (Gopalaswami
1959: 9; GoI 1964: 4; GoM 1965: 28). The initial
design of the LBP, which both had a smaller
command area and a more modest water demand
compared to later proposals, thus builds upon
known facts that full use of the LBP could only
take place during 60% of the years, and partial or
no use would be the outcome during the remaining
years.
1946 Plan – Design of the Engineers – All Dry
Despite the estimates on river flow indicating
insufficient water availability during 40% of the
years, the final plan included an increase in the
command area of about 22% to 84,000 ha, and a
40% extension of the canal length. Originally, the
entire command area was supposed to be located
only north of the Noyyal River (Figure 2), but after
pressure from a local “influential gentleman” by the
name of Hejaman, and with a motivation to let the
LBP also benefit the famine-prone Dharapuram sub-
district, the canal was extended 55 kilometers (km)
further south of Noyyal River to a total length of
200 km (GoM 1966: 14; Blomqvist 1996: 100). The
additional command area in the Dharapuram sub-
district covers 10,000 ha. To maintain the LBP at
84,000 ha and avoid a total increase in the
command area to 94,000 hectares, the increase in
the command area was balanced by an evenly
spread 12.5% reduction (known as “the
Dharapuram cut”) of the already planned command
area. The extension canal, sanctioned financially
by the government as a famine relief measure to
create jobs in the region (GoM 1966: 14-15), further
increased seepage and evaporation losses, which
were not included in the original estimates (GoI
1964). The main idea at the time was to share the
water supply, even though limited, to as many
people as possible.
The LBP was aimed for irrigated ‘dry crops’,
with cotton planned to cover half the area, and
other irrigated dry crops, like millets and
groundnuts, to cover the other half. Only seepage-
prone areas of about 4,000 ha would come under
paddy (Figure 3 and 4, 1946 Plan). Water was to
be supplied from September to March, with a cut10
in supply for one and a half months during the
Northeast monsoon, from middle October to the
end of November, to save water and utilize local
rainfall. Since the supply to the dry crops should
be intermittent, water was to be released and
provided according to a ‘set turn’ system. All
sluices along the main canal, the major
distributaries and branches were to be opened and
closed in alternate miles. Two equal zones were
created by naming all sluices from mile 1 to 2, 3
to 4, 5 to 6, etc., as ‘odd mile reaches’ and all
sluices from 2 to 3, 4 to 5, 6 to 7, etc., as ‘even
mile reaches’. The two zones in the LBP command
area are thus geographically mixed, and a farmer
in the ‘odd mile reach’ often has his field next to
a farmer within an ‘even mile reach’. With this
system, sluices were to be open during alternate
five and a quarter days and water was to be
provided for a particular field with an interval of ten
and a half days (GoM 1966: 173).
The expansion of the command area and
extension of canal length show how the planners
adjusted to the general demand for more cropping
land and pressure from strong local demands. It
shows how the design was changed in contradiction
to available hydrological knowledge for political
reasons. The question is whether these well-
intentioned plans could be implemented, and how
the outcome from the changed plans turned out.
1959 System – Choice of the Farmers – Wet/Wet
After the opening of the LBP canal, the paddy area
increased beyond the stipulated 4,000 ha (Figure
3). Crop restrictions were imposed by local
authorities, but the farmers opposed the restrictions
and paddy cultivation escalated further. The farmers
complained to the State Government, who made it
clear that “they were very anxious that the farmers
should have no cause for complaint” (Gopalaswami
1959: 15). Accordingly, engineers from the Public
Works Department (PWD) in charge of the Lower
Bhavani Reservoir had no option but to keep the
canal flowing as long as there was water available
in the dam (Gopalaswami 1959; Planning
Commission 1965).
The farmers preferred paddy as they regarded
this crop as being more profitable, and they also
claimed it was not possible to cultivate cotton as
planned, because there was too much soil
moisture from seepage. The farmers also argued
that cotton demanded too much manure and
preferred to grow groundnut on the more elevated
areas (Planning Commission 1965). During the five
and a quarter days of sluice opening, the farmers
under each sluice tried to acquire as much water
as possible to make up for the next five and a
quarter days of sluice closure. This behavior, of
farmers primarily at the head-end, and weaknesses
in canal management started a negative trend in
the use of water (Sivanappan n.d.). As a result,
more water had to be released (Figure 5, 1956/
1957, 1957/1958 and 1958/1959) and the initial
seepage problems increased, thereby stopping the
cultivation of dry crops and increasing further the
suitability to grow paddy.
In 1959, the Commissioner of Land Revenue
and Food Production, a Mr Gopalaswami,
consulted different experts, authorities and farmers
in the LBP area regarding a new allocation system
for the LBP. At an open meeting of farmers in the
LBP area it was decided to change the system.
With the ‘Wet-Wet’ system the cropping year was
divided into two seasons, August to November and
December to March. Half the command area would
get continuous supply during the first season and














































































































































































































































































































































































Fields belonging to “odd mile reaches” would
get supply in both the second and first season
during an odd calendar year, and land under “even
mile reaches” would get the same supply during
even years (Figure 4). The odd and even reach
methods that were originally designed to be used
for the ten and a half day supply interval in the “All
Dry” system was reassigned to be used on a
seasonal basis. All cropping restrictions were
removed allowing two wet crops (Gopalaswami
1959; GoI 1964: 8).
The LBP canal is designed mainly for dry
crops with intermittent supply and can only
discharge 6 Mm
3 of water per day. To irrigate wet
crops over the entire LBP command area about
double the discharged capacity, i.e., 12 Mm
3 per
day, would be necessary. It is thus not possible to
irrigate the entire command area with wet crops
during one season. By using the ‘odd’ and ‘even’
allocation system to create two seasonal zones
the entire canal discharge could be used on half
the area and doubling the water allowance per
FIGURE 4. Changes in the LBP canal water allocation system.
hectare will enable paddy cultivation. If the
discharge capacity of the canal had been higher
paddy cultivation over the entire command area
during the first season would otherwise have been
a better alternative, utilizing the northeast monsoon
and avoiding the hot weather during the second
season. The state government introduced the ‘Wet-
Wet’ system in 1959 as an experimental measure
to be extended from year to year (GoI 1964: 8).
During the ‘Wet-Wet’ system an average of
1,300 Mm
3 of water was released per year, which
is more than double the planned 650 Mm
3 (Figure
5). In reality, water was released continuously for
120-140 days every season, from July or August
until the end of April (PWD records). Paddy
cultivation increased, and during 1962/63 it covered
more than 50,000 ha, which is 73% of the irrigated
area (Figure 3). A period with extremely high
precipitation in the Upper Bhavani catchment with
peak inflows into the LBP Reservoir made it
possible to extend the Wet-Wet system over four










































































































































to the LBP Reservoir only allowed 550 Mm
3 to be
released into LBP Canal during the first season.
During the second season only 320 Mm
3 could be
released and the entire command area belonging to
the last half of the canal were denied irrigation
water (GoI 1964: 9).
The escalation of paddy cultivation shows how
the farmers refused to adopt the prescribed canal
irrigated dry crop pattern stipulated in the 1946
Plan. This method of canal irrigation was an
entirely new practice to the entire State of Tamil
Nadu (GoM 1965: 171). Farmers in the Coimbatore
area are known to be hard working and quick in
adapting new techniques. Unfortunately, there were
no research and demonstration farms in the
command area where the farmers could have learnt
the practices and advantages of canal-irrigated dry
crop cultivation. It was also difficult for the farmers
to vision the proposed large-scale canal-irrigated
dry crop cultivation (GoI 1964: 17). Before
completion of the entire LBP canal system,
farmers at the head-end of the canal took
advantage of the available surplus water quantities
to intensify cultivation. This development led to a
‘cropping anarchy’ with more and more land under
paddy. The authorities underestimated the strength
of local tradition. The only example of local canal
irrigation to learn from was the cropping pattern of
the historic Kodiveri and Kalingarayan canals where
riparian rights assure a continuous canal supply
with two to three paddy crops every year (GoI
1964: 15). The growing paddy cultivation shows the
negotiation strength and political power of the
farmers, being capable of convincing the irrigation
engineers to deliver a continuous supply instead of
intermittent supply, and to get support from the
state government for a changed system.
With the Wet-Wet system the existing division
of zones with sluices belonging to ‘odd’ and ‘even’
reaches was cleverly used to introduce a seasonal
partition of the command area. The Wet-Wet
system, agreed upon at the open meeting with the
Commissioner of Land Revenue and Food
Production, was a decision against known
hydrological facts. Of course, single farmers do not
have a perspective of the system, but instead they
focus on their own situation. From a “system water
use perspective” it was, however, clear that ‘dry
crops’ would have been more profitable, e.g.,
cotton would generate six times more profit per
water quantity supplied to the fields (GoI 1964: 15;
Gopalaswami 1959). The Wet-Wet system
demanded twice the estimated average yearly water
availability. The state government, nevertheless,
agreed to adapt to the demands of farmers and try
the Wet-Wet system. The decision by the
government to lift the crop restrictions and
jeopardize the long-term sustainability of the entire
LBP system must be viewed in the context of the
general famine affecting the entire nation. The
‘Grow More Food’ Campaign favored the cultivation
of rice and not cotton. India, as late as at the end
of the 1960s, was dependent on the import of
cereals and struggled to reach food self-sufficiency.
The exceptional water releases were possible
only because of very high inflows into the LBP
Reservoir during 1959/60-1962/63. The Wet-Wet
system had an ‘over optimistic’ design and it could
not continue during normal years.
1964 System – Compromise and Adjustment to
Seasonality – Wet/Dry
In 1963, the Madras Government intended to
restrict the cultivation of paddy “in order to
conserve and economically distribute the available
supply of water in the project (LBP) to the best
public advantage”. The government ordered a zoning
of the command area with “wet”, “garden” (land
with wells) and “dry” zones, and put a ceiling on
paddy cultivation of 24,000 ha (an increase
compared to the earlier planned 4,000 ha). Based
on pilot studies and experience of the field staff, it
was concluded that a reasonable limit for paddy
cultivation could “hardly be successfully carried
out”. The main reasons were seepage problems
and resistance from the farmers opposing
“interference with their own judgement of the crop
to be raised” (PWD 1984: 152).
In 1964, the Madras Government ordered that
a revised proposal for a new system should be
implemented, the “Wet-Dry” system. Even though
it was decided in 1964, because of “too much”
and “too little” inflow into the LBP Reservoir in the
years that followed, 1969/70 was the first year15
that releases were made for one wet and one dry
season (Figure 5). In the “Rules for Water
Regulation” it is stated that the total water
quantity for both seasons should be 1,020 Mm
3.
During the first season, August 15 to December
15, 680 Mm
3 of water was to be released as a
continuous canal supply and without any crop
restrictions. During the second season, December
15 to March 15, half the quantity, 340 Mm
3, was
to be released intermittently and only irrigated dry
crops were allowed. Any wet crops were to be
completely prohibited and heavily penalized. If
there was any “extra” water available in the
reservoir, the Chief Engineer at the PWD, after
special order from the government, was entitled to
release “a special supply” to farmers who did not
get water during the second season that year
(GoM 1964: 22; PWD 1984: 152-153). As shown
in figure 4 this “special supply” in 1978/79 and
1979/80 was released during the second season
parallel to the normal intermittent supply, and in
1992/93 and 1994/95 the “special supply” was
provided during May and June for a “third crop
period” (PWD records).
The current “Wet-Dry” system is an adaptation
to the demands of farmers to grow paddy and
opposed the government plans to limit paddy
cultivation. Compared to the Wet-Wet system, it is
a much better adaptation to the seasonal climatic
variations. During the northeast monsoon the heavy
rainfall makes it more suitable to grow wet crops,
while the sparse rainfall and hot climate during the
second season makes it favorable for dry crops,
with a minimum of seepage problems. The design
of the current system demands less water than the
“Wet-Wet” system, but still more than the average
availability, and also makes it difficult during most
years to leave a carry-over capacity from good to
bad years in the LBP Reservoir, as intended in the
original design of the 1946 plan (GoM 1965: 31).
The possibility for the Chief Engineer to utilize
excess water and release a “special supply” is an
embedded adaptation to the rules to have the
possibility to utilize the extra water available during
years with higher inflow than normal (compare
figures 5 and 7), but without including the quantity
in the regular allocation expectations.
1986 Modification – Equity between Farmers
and Adjustment to Annual Variation
Originally, the sustainable reservoir yield to be
allocated during majority of years was estimated at
650 Mm
3 per year (23,000 million cubic feet (Mcft))
(GoM 1965: 31). An analysis of the viability of the
entire project in 1964, based on data from 29
years (1934/35-1962/63), stated that “the project
anticipation may, at best, be based upon not more
than 850 Mm
3 (30,000 Mcft) utilizable storage” (GoI
1964: 12, 21). In the Madras Government order
from 1964 introducing the still existing “Wet-Dry”
allocation system, it is declared that “the total
commitments which the project can sustain is
1,020 Mm
3 (36,000 Mcft) of water” (PWD 1984:
152). During the last 44 years with the Wet-Dry
system in force, the supply for the LBP canal only
reached the anticipated 1,020 Mm
3 during 10 years
(Figure 5). For 22 years there was a supply equal
to, at least, 850 Mm
3 (the estimate from 1964).
This quantity is enough to give a sub-optimal
supply for both the first and second seasons. The
often used 75% dependability only equals to 550
Mm
3 per year.
As shown in Figure 5, there have been both
seasons and entire years without any water
released to the LBP command area. According to
the 1964 system, water is delivered to a fixed
schedule (Figure 4). If water supply is missed in a
particular season, it will be permanently lost and
the farmers scheduled to get water during one
season will not be compensated the next season
(Palanisami 1984: 26). This was the case during
the 1980s. By some twist of fate, almost all the
seasons without available water quantities in the
LBP Reservoir coincided with the turns for farmers
in the “even mile reach” area (compare Figure 4).
In the six years from 1982/83 to 1988/89, the
farmers in the “even mile reach” area should have
received canal supply during three dry and three
wet seasons, but only got canal supply for one dry
season and one wet season.
Therefore, the Chief Engineer at the PWD
suggested to the government (with the sanction of
farmers in the LBP area) to make an exception to
the rules and give the available water during
January to April 1988, which was to be allocated16
for farmers in the “odd mile reach” area, to farmers
in the “even mile reach” area (GoTN 1987). During
the drought of 2002-2004 this new praxis to make
the water supply more equitable was tested again.
After two seasons of water loss for farmers in the
“odd mile reach” area, the Lower Bhavani Farmers’
Federation held a public meeting on October 26,
2002 and the majority decided that the water
supply in the coming dry crop season which was
meant for farmers in the “even mile reach” area
should be released for farmers in the “odd mile
reach” area. Some farmers objected and the
decision was brought to the High Court of
Judicature at Madras that ruled in favor of the
Federation (District Collector 2003).
The current 1964 allocation system has an
‘inbuilt’ water scarcity relative to the designed
command area, and years without full adequate
supply are, therefore, unavoidable. Thanks to the
strong and vibrant Lower Bhavani Farmers
Association, the farmers have, thus, found a solution
to cope with the inequity that might take place. The
shift in allocation order from farmers in “odd” to
“even” mile reach sluice areas in 1988, and the shift
from “even” to “odd” in 2003 show how the farmers,
with the support from the authorities, have adapted
to the annual supply variability on a system level,
and tried to share the water in a fair way.
Adaptation of Engineers to the
Cropping Season Preferences of
Farmers
The District Collector decides the opening and
closure of the canal in consultation with the PWD
authorities and the people’s representations
(Shanmugham 1991: 13). The “Rules of Regulation”
state that the first season should last from August
15 until December 15 (120 days) and the second
season from December 15 until March 15 (90 days)
(PWD 1984: 152). The real outcome from the 36
Wet seasons and the 23 Dry seasons since 1964/
65 with canal supply shows a different pattern.
About 75% of the second seasons end during the
last two weeks of April or the first two weeks of
May, and there is no record of a closure in March
at all. Today, farmers and others normally refer to
April 15 as the end date for the second season,
even though regulations still state that it is March
15. On average, the first season is extended to
133 days and the second season to 114 days.
This shows how the PWD engineers and the
District Collector have adapted to the practiced
canal management and succumbed to the desires
of farmers in the LBP area and extended both the
Wet and Dry seasons.
Farm Level Adaptations to
Unpredictable Canal Supply in the
LBP Area
During the initial years after the opening of the
canal in the 1950s, the farmers in the LBP area
demanded enough water to be able to grow paddy.
After experimentation with the Wet-Wet system the
final outcome turned out to be the current Wet-Dry
system from 1964. With the present system there
are both scheduled seasons without canal supply
for every farmer, every second year, and unplanned
seasons without supply, during years with inflow to
the LBP Reservoir below the level of demand.
As expected, many farmers often, but
unpredictably, experience an untimely and
inadequate water supply. The middle and tail end
distributaries of the main LBP Canal are, to a
larger extent, progressively deprived of their
allocations (Shanmugham 1991). It is also clear
that farmers with large landholdings (or other
power) within each distributary are able to influence,
and ensure, their own water supply. In contrast, the
marginal farmers are more affected by untimely
and insufficient water allocations (e.g., according to
a survey, 43% during initial growth stages) (Centre
for Water Resources 2003).
Farmers have adapted to problems of water
scarcity in various ways. One way is to find
additional water resources, mainly from
groundwater sources. Another option is to adjust
the cropping pattern to suit the water availability.
Additional Water Resources
The wells that already existed in the command
area before the construction of the LBP Canal were
quickly recharged by the ample seepage water,17
and many farmers saw the benefits of increasing
the supplemental irrigation from groundwater
(Palanisami 1984: 36). In the 1950s, farmers in the
LBP area expressed a desire for full freedom to
“sink wells”, and demanded increased access to
electricity (Gopalaswami 1959). The authorities, on
the other hand, tried to restrict the number of wells
in the command area and limit their use only
during the off-season and for dry crops. Apart from
some remaining restrictions, the ban against new
wells within the command area was lifted in 1965.
In 1956, besides wells with bullocks, there were
about 400 diesel pumps and 200 electrical pumps
(Saravanan 2001). In 1989, there were about
30,000 wells in the 162 revenue villages in the LBP
command area, 50% with electricity, 30% with
diesel and 20% with bullocks (Shanmugham 1991:
17). Following the trend of the number of wells in
the Erode District (Lannerstad 2008), the number
of wells in the LBP command area has increased
to about 35,000 and all bullocks have been
replaced by electricity pumps.
Wells are recharged both during the monsoon
and when there is canal water released in the
command area. During the monsoon season, the
water table ranges from 1 to 9 meters (m) and
during the dry months it drops to 7 to 24 m below
ground level (Shanmugham 1991: 17). More than
30 years of observation well data inside the LBP
area show a rather stable recharge over the years
(PWD data).
During the 1960s the irrigation authorities set
up 34 schemes, “Harnessing Schemes”, to capture
seepage and drainage from the LBP command
area, and this increased the command area by
7,000 ha (PWD n.d. (b)). Today, less than half are
working due to reduced drainage water reaching
these “tail end” schemes (pers. comm. PWD
2004-2007). This illustrates the effectiveness of
water use in the field and groundwater utilization in
the LBP command area. According to the 1946
Plan, one-fourth of the water let into the LBP canal
was regarded as being “lost” to evaporation and
seepage. However, “experience shows that the
greater part of the water which was expected to be
lost is not really lost” (Gopalaswami 1959: 6), and
the water reappears as seepage in low-lying fields
or raises the groundwater level and is available in
the wells. So, thanks to the wells of the farmers,
part of the water released into the command area
can be applied to the fields more than once.
Well water is not always sufficient and some
farmers have individually turned towards water
resources outside the command area. They
abstract water directly from the Bhavani River, the
southern Kodiveri Canal or the Kalingarayan Canal
which all delineate the LBP command area. Both
the canals and the river have a continuous supply
during almost the entire year. Most of these
arrangements are unauthorized. Thanks to
improvement of pump and pipe technology, water
can be transferred long distances. Single farmers
can finance smaller arrangements, while groups
together share the costs of larger endeavors. One
scheme is pumping water from the Kalingarayan
Canal more than 7 km into the LBP command area
(PWD pers. comm. 2004-2007).
The current LBP canal supply system has an
inbuilt water scarcity, and the porous soils cause
large amounts of seepage. The farmers in the LBP
area understood the potential of supplemental
irrigation. The authorities initially tried to stop this
development, but later had to accept this quite
successful adaptation. Today, most of the wells
also have electricity connections. The groundwater
data also indicates that the practice is sustainable.
The more recent trend to pump water from other
irrigation canals and the Bhavani River is,
compared to the wells, an adaptation that the
authorities cannot formally agree to. The
continuation of these unauthorized arrangements,
however, point to some kind of passive
acceptance, or political inability to terminate this
behavior.
The strong and vibrant farmer’s organization in
the command area, the Lower Bhavani Farmers’
Federation, also try to convince the government to
change the “Rules for Water Regulation” (PWD
1984) to reduce the quantity of water released for
the Kodiveri and Kalingarayan canals and give a
larger proportion of the yearly inflow to the LBP
Reservoir to the LBP Canal. The Federation, thus,
questions the historic water rights in the basin, but
has so far not gained support for their claims.18
Flexibility in Cropping Pattern
The changes in cropping pattern following
alternating canal supply during four years, 1982/83
to 1985/86, are illustrated in Figure 3 (compare
figure 5 and 6). The left column visualizes the
crops on half of the command area that is
supposed to receive canal supply during both the
first and the second seasons. The right column,
“No Supply Area” shows the crops on the half that
has to rely entirely upon precipitation and, for those
who have wells, groundwater. Supply was given for
both seasons in 1983/84 and 1984/85. During such
normal years about 40,000 ha of paddy and 20,000
ha of groundnut dominate the cropping pattern. In
1982/83 supply was only given during the first
season and the irrigated dry crops normally
belonging to the second season are missing. In
1985/86 water was given as three “wettings” to
raise irrigated dry crops like sesame during one
season. The limited water given during this year
makes it look very similar to the cropping pattern
of the normal “No Supply Area”, with a large area
with rainfed fodder sorghum, and other well-irrigated
or rainfed dry crops.
The cropping patterns in figures 3 and 6 clearly
show how the farmers cope with the variable canal
supply by growing well-irrigated or rainfed crops. A
long-term adaptation has been accomplished by
the farmers that have a well, or those who get
water from a source outside the command area.
Nevertheless, not all farmers have wells and the
uncertainty in water supply under the current
allocation system leaves many farmers without real
cropping opportunities during many seasons. It is,
therefore, common that farmers also seek work
options on other farms, or outside agriculture. To
have one family member working outside agriculture
is in a way, on a family income level, an
adaptation to bridge the erratic incomes within the
LBP farming system. The current trend of industrial
development in the area and the commuting
possibilities that have dramatically improved
recently, have made it feasible for many members
of farmer families to find new complementary
livelihood options outside the LBP command area.
FIGURE 6. Cropping patterns during normal conditions for farms with and without canal supply, and with and without wells for
supplemental irrigation (Source: modified from: Shanmugam 1991: 14).19
Future challenges
There will be increased competition over water
resources in the closed Bhavani Basin. As shown
in Figure 7, the inflow to the LBP Reservoir is
falling. Upstream of the dam, increased water
demands such as irrigation of vegetables, river
pumping, changed rainfed vegetation cover with a
higher consumptive water use, evaporation from
hydropower reservoirs, and drinking water out of
basin transfers, have all contributed to a reduced
inflow to the LBP Reservoir (Lannerstad 2008).
Climate change (Bates et al. 2008) or long-term
cycles of climate variation might also contribute to
the trend. The different factors causing the
reduction of river flow from the Upper Bhavani have
not all been studied and quantified so far.
Present drinking water withdrawals are,
however, likely to increase from the present 160
Mm
3 to more than 210 Mm
3 per year in the near
future. The major part is out-of-basin transfers from
Upper Bhavani to the rapidly growing Coimbatore
and Tiruppur cities along the ephemeral Noyyal
River (Figure 2). At the time of construction of the
LBP Reservoir, annual drinking water withdrawals
only measured 4 Mm
3. The LBP Canal has the
lowest priority in Bhavani Basin because of historic
riparian rights (Lannerstad 2008). The drinking
water withdrawals are, thus, a direct competing
demand. Withdrawals above the reservoir equal
17% of the designated annual demand for the LBP
area, or 50% of the water supply during the second
season. Together with other factors that increase
the consumptive water uses upstream of the
reservoir, the drinking water out-of-basin transfers
can mean more seasons without canal supply for
farmers in the LBP area.
The competition for water is also tightening for
the entire Cauvery Basin. The LBP Reservoir is
regarded by many as a “Surplus Project” intended
to only impound and use water excess of the
riparian rights of farmers in the Cauvery Delta and
those in the historic command areas in the
Bhavani Basin. The large number of farmers in the
delta represents a strong political influence. When
the competition for water increases in other parts
of the closed Cauvery Basin, there is a risk that
water will be requested from the LBP Reservoir.
This happened during the extreme drought of 2003/
04 when water was released for the Cauvery Delta,
while no water was given at all to any of the
command areas in Bhavani basin (PWD records).
In January 2007, the Indian National Court of
Arbitration delivered the “The Report of the Cauvery
Water Disputes Tribunal with the Decision” to
resolve the last Cauvery Dispute between the
states of Karnataka and Tamil. The Decision
provides a settlement on the amount of water that
each of the Cauvery Basin states can utilize (GoI
2007). Some of the present diversions into the
historic canals are not included in the estimates
because they are not part of earlier interstate
agreements (GoI 2007, IV: 141). In the perspective
of a closed Cauvery Basin, this means that these
water quantities are not accounted for to be used
within the Bhavani Basin. The LBP will, thus, have
to be considered in both the context of the Bhavani
Basin and, again after almost 100 years, in the
context of the Cauvery Basin.
As agriculture becomes integrated into the global
economy, farmers in the LBP area are facing
transformation challenges. Already, many farmers
experience rising input costs. Competition with the
flourishing nearby urban areas has increased the labor
costs. Many workers leave the unreliable and
seasonal agricultural jobs and seek employment in
the textile and other industries. As a consequence,
mechanization is a recent trend in the area. Some
farmers also chose less labor-intensive crops, like
coconut plantations. Many farmers invest in their
children’s education as they see no future in
agriculture. Changing demands for agricultural
products because of changes in food preferences and
a demand for industrial crops, with a trend towards
contract farming, like sugarcane, will also drive





























































































































AWM Analysis and Discussion
The LBP trajectory presents a number of changes
and adaptations during the last 50 years. By using
the framework presented it is possible to see how
well the LBP experience matches the theories of
AWM. To reiterate, the five main questions to be
considered relate to 1. adapting or coping; 2.
uncertainty; 3. the AM process; 4. Social learning;
and 5. Adaptive regimes and adaptability.
Adapt to what, and at what scale
Within a cross-disciplinary research collaboration,
Dewulf et al. (2007) have analyzed the perception
of the AM idea and describe how different persons
frame the concept. Central questions for
participants in the study were: “Who or what is
adapting, changing and learning?”; “What is it that
they adapt, change or learn?”, and “In response to
what do they adapt, change, or learn?”. This
highlights the difficulty of defining the boundaries
of an AM system, and where to place the actors
participating in the process. There is a difference
between discussing aspects inside a system, that
are adapting or being adapted, and aspects that
are outside the system, that the system adapts
to (ibid).
The LBP system is a complex human-
environmental-technology system and is, thus,
difficult to delineate. The spatial boundaries appear
to be easy to define by stating that it only includes
the LBP command area. The LBP Reservoir is,
however, also a part of the system - at least, the
management of how water is released into LBP
Canal. In addition, the LBP area is part of Bhavani
Basin and, in a larger context, is also part of the
Cauvery Basin. The human component, with
irrigation engineers and politicians in charge of the
policy development and management, is not like
the farming community only found within the
command area, but is spread over the Erode and
Coimbatore districts, in other parts of Tamil Nadu,
and, perhaps, even in India as a whole.
The drivers behind the establishment and
changes of LBP originate at different scales.
Initially, construction of the reservoir was a water
storage project for farmers in the delta in the
Cauvery Basin. It was only after the decision to
build the Mettur Reservoir that the LBP project was
considered again. This time, the project should
benefit the people in the famine-prone Coimbatore
District. The construction was, however, inhibited
because the project did not fulfil the economic
return of the British Empire. After Independence in
1947, the project was sanctioned with a national
Indian interest. Since the completion of the LBP,
all the changes in water allocations and cropping
pattern have been an internal question within the
Bhavani Basin. After the introduction of the “Wet-
Dry” system in 1964, it is more or less an internal
issue within the LBP command area.
In the analysis of the LBP system, it is
necessary to look upon “the system” as generally
confined within the limits of the LBP command
area, but also allow the definition to, with a certain
degree of “plasticity”, occasionally stretch out.
Some actors will also have both a role as an
external force, and an internal actor within the
system.
Adapting or coping
The LBP case study clearly displays a pattern of
adaptive strategies. Over the years farmers and
authorities together have adapted to each other, to
available water resources relative to the size of the
command area, and the environmental conditions
in the LBP command area. The increased food
production from the fields in the LBP area has
been of immense importance for the survival and
rising standard of living for people in the area.
Considering the fact that groundwater levels in the
command area remain quite stable, with only
insignificant salt accumulation problems, the
system appears to be environmentally sustainable
from a water perspective. The water allocation
design has been adapted to meet the demands of
farmers and climatic realities over more than 50
years.22
An example of a proactive response is the
establishment of wells in the command area for
conjunctive use to increase the reliability in timing
of water supply to the field, and to balance the
seasonal and yearly water scarcity experienced in
the system. This development was held back by
the authorities in the beginning, but later the idea
was accepted and supported by the removal of
hampering policies and an expansion of electricity
connections in the area.
The 1964 water allocation and cropping system
is an adaptive strategy to embrace human
demands and adjust to the limits and seasonality
of nature. With continuous water supply during the
first season all farmers could continue to cultivate
paddy, even though this was possible only every
second year, and the system gained acceptance
from the farmer community and met the food
production demands from society. With paddy
during the first season, and intermittent water
supply and only irrigated “dry crops” during the
second season, the system matches the rainfall
seasonality and reduces water demand closer to
the sustainable yield. The option in the “Rules of
Regulation” to release excess water for a third
crop is an additional step in an adaptive strategy
to maximize water use over seasons and years
with high variability.
Another example is the capacity built up in the
system to “cope” with the great variability in canal
supply. Farmers in the LBP area have acquired the
competence to cultivate a range of crops depending
on the water allocation during a specific season.
During the drought of 2003/2004 there was no
water to be allocated for any of the canals in
Bhavani Basin. For the first time, the historic
canals under Kalingarayan and Kodiveri weirs
experienced seasons without canal diversions.
Stable supply of 10 to 11 months had made many
of these farmers rely on paddy cultivation. Few
wells and no practice of growing rainfed crops left
them without any options. In the LBP area,
farmers could cope to a much higher degree thanks
to social learning and adaptive strategies.
Uncertainty
The LBP is an adaptation to overcome the great
seasonal and annual variability of precipitation in
the area. This is the imperative factor creating
uncertainty in how to manage the LBP system.
During the last 50 years the inflow to the reservoir
has varied from more than 4,500 Mm
3 per year to
as little as only about 500 Mm
3 per year (Figure
7). In some years there is no water to be allocated
for the LBP Canal at all, and in some years the
rich reservoir inflow is enough for both surplus
releases into the Bhavani River, and is sufficient for
a wet crop, a dry crop and may even supply water
for a short third crop in the LBP Command area
(Figure 5). River flow data and rainfall estimates
have been available since the beginning of the
twentieth century. Even with data, the high variability
makes it difficult to predict the future. The “average
year” almost never occurs and the statistics can
consequently only be used to get an
understanding of the maximum and minimum water
availability.
In the original plan, research results proposed
an ideal outcome based on engineering and
agronomic knowledge. The human factor and the
true environmental realities could only be
understood after the implementation. The lessons
learnt over the years from the outcome of canal
supply, groundwater use, rainfall over the command
area, seepage effects, crop choice and cultivation
practices have all contributed to an increased
understanding of how the water supply, the
environment, and the farmers work together within
the system. Today, there is quite an extensive
knowledge of how the system works, but this still
poses a management uncertainty.
An important factor for the functioning of the
system, and the livelihoods of the farmers, is the
demand and prices offered for different agricultural
produce. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s paddy
cultivation was an attractive and remunerative crop.
Today, small farmers still appreciate paddy as it
can be sold according to stable government23
procurement prices and can be stored and
consumed within the household. During interviews
in 2007, many farmers expressed concerns about
how paddy cultivation had become uneconomical.
Labor costs and agricultural inputs had increased,
but at the same time that the market price had
fallen even below the state procurement price. The
farmers discussed opportunities to change the
entire water allocation design for the LBP to
cultivate other crops. They would prefer sugarcane.
With the surge in the global price of cereals during
the first half of 2008, the situation has probably
changed. The price volatility is an example of how
the global economy increases uncertainty at a local
level.
The present system with two zones during a
cropping year in a three step mode can utilize as
much water as the amount that was consumed
during the years of the Wet-Wet system (compare
1959/60-62/63 with, for example, 1978/79 and
1994/95 in Figure 5). During the first season, the
same water quantity that was the total annual
demand in the 1946 plan, can be used for one
paddy crop on half of the command area. In the
second season, an additional volume, equivalent to
about half the quantity in the 1946 plan, can be
used for the dry crops on the other zone. The third
step is the possibility to utilize an available surplus
quantity for a third short crop on the non-supply
zone during the second season, or during the third
season when the canal is usually closed (Figures
4 and 5, 1977/78-79/80 and 1992/93 and 1994/95).
From a societal perspective, this management
system optimally utilizes the inflow to the LBP
Reservoir up to the limit of the discharge capacity
of the LBP Canal. From the individual farmer’s
perspective, it is a system with a high uncertainty
and an unpredictable livelihood set up. In a way,
the present system puts farmers in the LBP
command area in a permanent state of “stand by”
since full water supply for both seasons occur
during less than 50% of the years. The fact that
two lost seasons in a row means no canal water
for three years (Figure 4) makes it complicated for
the single farmer to base the household economy
on canal-irrigated crops. This system has
consequently forced the farmers, individually and
collectively, to adapt, improve and optimize the
suboptimal set up.
AM Process
The changes in the design, water allocation
scheme, cropping pattern, and water use in the
LBP illustrates how the initiative moves back and
forth from different actors, like the engineers, the
local authorities, national demands, LBP Farmers’
Federation, and the individual choice of farmers.
The implementation of the original plan and every
system change that have followed can be viewed
as AM cycles (Figure 1). It shows how the original
plan has been adjusted step-by-step to become the
present complex human-nature-technology system.
With the cycles of system change over the
years, the knowledge about the system has
increased and the three types of uncertainty stated
in the section, Adaptive Water Management:
Concepts and Analysis Framework, above, have
either been reduced or considered in the rules.
More and more data is collected over the years and
the knowledge of the outcomes on a system level,
in relation to, for example, seepage and the
reactions of farmers, have increased the
understanding of the system and this knowledge
has been used for planning the next goal and
design formulation. The major uncertainty, variability
in water availability, has been considered and
included in the management rules. Two zones and
up to three potential crops makes it possible to
adjust the system to any water availability: no
crop; one wet; one dry; one wet and one dry; one
wet, one dry and one short third crop; or only one
short crop during the entire year (Figure 5, 1986).
The original goal was to build a reservoir
across Bhavani River and use the perennial flow to
increase and intensify the cultivation in the region.
Before the original LBP plan, designed by
engineers and agronomists, reached the
implementation phase it faced opposition from other
parts of society. The original design of the
command area and the cropping pattern and crop
composition - that would be in balance with average
water availability and give all farmers a reliable and24
stable annual income during most years - were
disrupted by increasing the command area and
extending the canal. The 1946 plan, “All Dry”
became a first step towards a higher probability of
non-supply years for the individual farmer. The plan
could never be implemented since farmers in action
refused to cultivate canal-irrigated “dry crops” and
with the support of the Madras State Government
chose to cultivate paddy.
The “Wet-Wet” system, that increased the
water demand by 100%, is the first water allocation
design that was fully implemented. After a couple
of fortunate water rich years, the design was
evaluated as unrealistic. In 1963, the government
investigated the possibilities to put a ceiling on
paddy cultivation and bring back the LBP system
closer to the original level of water demand. Once
again, the farmers refused to adjust and the goal
to formulate a design with zones with different
irrigation intensity was rejected. The present “Wet-
Dry” system of water allocation and cropping
pattern from 1964 is a compromise between
precipitation seasonality, average water availability
considered by the engineers, and the demands for
paddy cultivation from farmers and society. It was
implemented and it was not until the mid-1980s
that it proved to be unsatisfactory and the
modification made to the system in 1986 was
formulated and implemented. Consequently,
farmers and the authorities have adapted to each
other over the years.
It might appear remarkable that the original
design, based on river flow availability, was rejected
by both politicians and farmers. The initial canal
extension and expansion of the command area
must be viewed from a perspective of a local
famine and poverty. A reservoir was being built and
why should not, as many as possible, benefit from
the project? A larger command area also made it
possible to utilize all the water during peak years.
The changes towards paddy cultivation must be
viewed in the context of the general national food
deficiency situation with food aid programs like the
P.L. 480, the “Grow More Food” Campaign and a
with the close memory of famines. Food shortage
problems and a general trend of dietary preferences
towards rice, away from coarse grains, made both
authorities and farmers favor remunerative paddy
cultivation instead of cotton and millets.
The outcome from every version of the system
is monitored with records of releases into the LBP
canal (Figure 5) and agricultural statistics with crop
areas and yields (Figure 3). For a number of years
other data has also been in existence, e.g.,
records with changes in the groundwater level and
the chemical status of groundwater in the area.
The statistics and reactions from farmers, such as
the violation of rules of the system, give a clear
feedback to the planners for the next cycle of
design formulation.
Every development of a change in the LBP
system is similar to the cycles described by the
AWM theory. The cycle does not always complete
the full circle. Often farmers or other actors have
intervened at an early stage, and as a result a new
goal has to be set, and a new design has to be
formulated. It is interesting to note that the “Wet-
Wet” design, however unrealistic, was a real test
implementation in line with today´s idea of AWM.
The ‘voice’ of the farmers is very strong in the LBP
system and only the “Wet-Wet”, “Wet-Dry” and the
“1986 modification” have been fully implemented
without interruption. The farmers have participated
in the policy formulation of all these three systems.
It shows that without participatory policy
formulation, implementation has been difficult.
Adaptive Regimes and Adaptability
Since the inauguration of the LBP system it has
moved, partly, from a “predict-and-control-regime”
towards an “integrated adaptive regime”. The
governance structure, today, is much more
polycentric. The system change in 1986, confirmed
by a public meeting of farmers in 2002 and a court
order in 2003, visualizes the broad stakeholder
participation on a system level. This can be
compared with the original design that was only
decided by experts. The transition has to be viewed
in the general societal development that has made
farmers more knowledgeable. An example is the
literacy rate for Tamil Nadu. In 1951, the literacy
rate was only 21% (even lower in the countryside)25
and by 2001 it had reached 74% (Department of
Economics and Statistics 2006).
In 1955, the infrastructure could be
characterized as massive, centralized and a single
source of design, power and delivery. The
extensive groundwater development in the LBP
area, and some river and canal pumping, has
resulted in a kind of decentralized water supply
infrastructure for many farmers, where the single
farmer - thanks to a more reliable water availability
- can invest in high value crops or change to
perennial cultivation.
Sector integration and scale of analysis and
operation are only slowly moving towards the
description of an “adaptive regime”. The LBP
command area is affected more and more by the
changes and the increased complexity in Bhavani
Basin. During the last decades, the inflow to the
LBP Reservoir has been decreasing (Figure 7).
There is, however, no complete structured analysis
that put the LBP system in the context of an
increasingly complex and multiple sector basin
perspective. River flows and authorized allocations
of surface water are all documented by the PWD
or other authorities. This information is not widely
accessible. Even if the basic information is shared
openly, the public would probably not understand
the complexity of the information. One major
reason is that the great variability is hiding the
long-term trends.
Considering the definition of adaptive capacity
given by Pahl-Wostl et al. (2007), the LBP system
partly fulfils the requirements. Performance
indicators with canal releases and crop outputs
have been recorded since the inauguration. Daily
flow readings along the LBP canal and for all major
side canals exist. Unfortunately, detailed data is
not being kept over the years and only monthly or
seasonal records are available at the engineers’
offices. These are the records available with the
LBP Farmers’ Federation, researchers and some
authorities. Based on the monthly, seasonal or
yearly data, the actors in the LBP system can
draw basic conclusions. Changes in the system
that have taken place also show that actors, on a
system level, accept and understand why the
changes are taking place. This is especially true for
the Wet-Dry system from 1964 and the system
modification in 1986.
Social learning
The origin of today’s Tamil Nadu Agricultural
University, TNAU, was founded by the British in
1868 in Madras (The Agricultural School at
Saidapet) and relocated to Coimbatore in 1906.
It became a university in 1971. In 1955, the
Bhavanisagar Agricultural Research Station
(today part of the TNAU) was established next to
the LBP Reservoir. The location of the TNAU and
the TNAU research station means that the center
for all agricultural research and knowledge in the
state is situated very close to the Bhavani Basin
and some partly even inside the LBP Command
area. About 100 years of rainfall data is available
with the statistical department in Chennai, and
the PWD in charge of irrigation water distribution
have measures for river and canal flow for the
same period. All kinds of knowledge and
expertize are, thus, available in the area. Despite
this, many decisions regarding the LBP and the
water allocation for the command area have
been taken in opposition to known facts. The
perception and demands of farmers and other
parts of the society have strongly influenced the
system design and clearly illustrate the
importance to include the human component
early in natural resource management, and the
hazard when not.
The original “All Dry” plan from 1946 was a
novelty in the LBP area. The designed cropping
pattern with irrigated dry crops was tested in the
area. The refusal of farmers in the LBP area to
cultivate dry crops, can, however, clearly be a sign
of ‘social learning’ in the area. The farmers learned
the cultivation of paddy from the historic canals.
Farmers found it difficult to imagine a large-scale
irrigation of “dry crops” and claimed that seepage
would make it impossible. The authorities
underestimated the need to support the farmers in
learning the new practice. With the introduction of
the “Wet-Dry” system in 1964 the old idea with “dry
crops” was introduced a second time. The planners26
had learned from the arguments of farmers and
moved the practice to the dry season. The farmers
accepted the arrangement and all the farmers can
now cultivate canal-irrigated dry crops.
The entire chain of system changes shows
that social learning is taking place within the LBP
system. The initial over-optimism resulted in a
design with an over-dimensioned water demand
and cropping area. The different actors have
together learned how to optimize the system within
the limits of the technical infrastructure, the
reservoir capacity and the canal discharge
capacity, and the variability in available supply
decided the by the erratic precipitation.
The way farmers have learned and been
inspired by each other, like the benefits from
conjunctive groundwater use and the acceptance of
irrigated dry crops, are examples of social learning
between actors at short timescales. On a long-
term perspective, all the actors in the LBP system
have learned from the environmental responses and
each other’s behavior. Together they have
contributed to the alteration of governance
structures and have developed new innovative
practices without being bound and limited by the
original use of the existing technical infrastructure.
The historic knowledge about how the current
situation emerged does, however, not seem to be
part of the average understanding of engineers,
researchers or farmers in the area. During years of
water scarcity, many complain about the situation,
but few appear to be aware that it is the farmers
that forced the government to introduce the present
system. After the failure of the Wet-Wet system,
a less water demanding system was proposed in
1963, but again, it was rejected by the farmers.
The present Wet-Dry system does not allow any
“carry over” storage from wet to dry years, and,
thus, increased the uncertainty for the single
farmer. All actors, thus, live with change, but few
appear to remember what caused the change in the
system and why it changed.
Conclusion and Messages for Policymakers
The LBP is an example of an irrigation system that
has proved to adapt over time. Several changes
have taken place and earlier mistakes or failures
have been addressed in a stepwise way to reach
the present complex human-environment-
technological system. In general, the system
performs well and has served the farmers and the
region well for more than 50 years despite massive
changes in agrarian and social structure.
What adaptations have taken place in the LBP?
Over time the interplay between farmers and water
authorities have resulted in a flexible irrigation
system that has adjusted to the natural seasonal
variability in rainfall and annual water availability,
the demands of society, at large, and water users
- the farmers. Compared to the original project
plan, adjusted according to the estimate of assured
annual water availability in the basin, the present
system has a 20% larger command area and a
60% increase in yearly water demand. This has
created a system with inbuilt water scarcity and
high unpredictability, leaving the farmers to endure
and adapt to frequent seasons without canal
supply. The farmers in the LBP area have proved
to be able to adapt over the years. The large-scale
development of wells in the area shows how the
farmers have successfully managed to increase
water availability to balance water scarcity during
seasons without supply. The farmers have also
acquired a capacity to swiftly adjust the cropping
pattern to the highly unpredictable variability of
seasonal canal water supply, and also to entirely
rainfed conditions.27
How well does the LBP match the ideas of
AWM?
The AWM analysis shows that the LBP system
has, over the years, fulfilled the criteria of a
complex adaptive system more and more. The
system proves to have an adaptive capacity and
farmers not only cope in an ad hoc manner but
have developed different adaptive strategies. To a
large degree, the system fulfils the requirement of
an adaptive regime. Social learning takes place at
both system level and at the individual farmer’s
level. The uncertainty factors have been considered
in a stepwise way during the system change
cycles and have been included in the system
design. The system has moved from a top-down
project to a management system with multiple
actors. Both farmers and the authorities have
learned over the years and now have better
possibilities to interact.
When compared to the current theories
regarding AM and adaptive regimes, the LBP
system behaves in many ways as the theories
suggest. Even though the development over the
years has not been carried out with the AWM
theories as the road map, the LBP system has
over time proved to follow many of the ideas
brought forward within this field of research. The
LBP case study thus shows that AM already takes
place in real life. This is a surprising conclusion,
because it is often held that irrigation systems do
not adapt well.
What policy suggestions can be drawn from the
LBP?
Some key lessons can be drawn for policymakers.
Policymakers need to tap into a rich skill set
available in the agricultural community that
includes the local knowledge of farmers and
resource managers in order to promote AM.
Policies should foster collaboration between
different knowledge holders, and experimentation as
done in the LBP. To allow for upcoming
modifications, the design of large infrastructure
should take into consideration a range of possible
changes that may occur. This also includes
recognizing that it is impossible to get everything
right because of future uncertainties.
The failed implementation of the original LBP
plan shows the importance of nourishing social
learning before or during implementation of
complex systems and new practices. The LBP
design was based on the introduction of large-
scale irrigation of “dry crops”, like groundnut and
cotton. The authorities underestimated the need
for widespread training to introduce this novelty.
Social learning is necessary to get the
acceptance and cooperation of the users. If the
engineers had invested more energy in this
aspect, the LBP system would have experienced
less turbulence before reaching equilibrium where
nature, technology and humans agree.
The closure of the Bhavani Basin will progress
and the complexity and interconnectedness between
basin water users will increase. The LBP command
area has the weakest riparian rights and additional
water demands from other users in the Bhavani
Basin might create a new threshold to which the
system will have to adapt. It will probably be
necessary to find compromises in the future and
will, in line with integrated adaptive regime theories,
be of great importance that the information on how
water is allocated and aspects of performance from
a basin perspective are shared openly.
Finally, the LBP case study gives us hope. In
spite of contending with an imperfect irrigation
system design and intense competition for water
resources, water resource managers and farmers
are able to adapt and continue to reap benefits
from a productive agriculture system. Users of the
LBP system have proved to be capable of
dynamically tackling new situations arising in a
changing environmental and societal context. The
LBP, thus, shows that the fear of collapse of
today’s irrigation systems is overestimated.28
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